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INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, the United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights1 (ICCPR or Covenant), one of the central treaties in international 
human rights law. The ICCPR shares much of the substance of its well-known 
precursor, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,2 but the two 
instruments differ in one crucial respect: while the Declaration enumerates 
fundamental rights that ought to be enjoyed by all human beings, the Covenant 
actually binds governments that ratify it under international law.3 Moreover, as a 
 
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, UC Irvine School of Law. I owe thanks for helpful discussions 
with and comments by Tendayi Achiume, Chris Whytock, the members of the 2011 to 2012 UCLA 
International Justice Clinic, the participants in the UCI symposium on Human Rights Litigation in 
State Courts and Under State Law, and Sasha Nichols of the UC Irvine Law Review. All errors, of 
course, are my own. 
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. 
E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 
(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
3. This may be self-evident in the titles of the instruments. As Vratislav Pechota put it,  
“A covenant leaves no doubt about the legal nature of the provisions it contains, whereas a 
declaration is often deemed to enunciate moral roles only.” Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON 
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treaty ratified by the United States, the Covenant enjoys status under the U.S. 
Constitution as “supreme law of the land.”4  
Despite its status as a treaty in U.S. law, the Covenant enjoys a tenuous 
foothold in American law. American courts from time to time refer to the rules 
codified by the Covenant, even with approval, but they have repeatedly held the 
Covenant to be unenforceable domestically, unavailable to litigants as a legal basis 
for causes of action. This is largely the result of the U.S. understanding, at the time 
of ratification, that the Covenant is non-self-executing, requiring legislation to give 
it legal effect in U.S. courts. Since then, however, neither Congress nor state 
legislatures has incorporated the ICCPR into federal or state law. As a result, no 
domestic legal mechanism exists to test whether the United States complies with 
its obligations under the ICCPR. 
The Covenant and much of international human rights law have had limited 
impact in American courts.5 But might it be possible to imagine a time when 
individuals claiming a violation of the ICCPR or other human rights treaties may 
seek to enforce these treaties in the United States? A prison inmate, repeatedly 
raped without intercession by authorities, claims that the state failed to protect 
him from “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”6 A victim of 
forced labor trafficking claims that the state failed to protect her from slavery and 
servitude.7 A municipality adopts zoning regulations making it onerous for a 
neighborhood religious community to build a new facility, and clergy bring a 
claim.8 Students at a state university claim that their right to peaceful assembly is 
impaired when the school restricts student protests.9 All of these hypothetical 
 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 32, 35 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). The U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized the binding nature of the Covenant under international law. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004) (noting that “the Covenant does bind the United States as a matter of 
international law”). 
4. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
5. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of 
Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 259 (2001) (“[M]ost courts refuse to 
view international law claims as relevant to the resolution of specific cases.”); Brad R. Roth, 
Understanding the “Understanding”: Federalism Constraints on Human Rights Implementation, 47 WAYNE L. 
REV. 891, 893 (2001) (“[I]t is difficult to identify with certainty a legal difference that the U.S. 
ratification of the ICCPR has made, on either the international or the domestic plane.”); Peter J. 
Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 567 (1997) (stating that the 
U.S. ratification conditions “limit[ ] the scope of ratification to existing U.S. practice, rendering 
acceptance a largely hollow, falsely symbolic act”). It goes too far to say that the Covenant has had no 
impact at the federal level, if only because of U.S. participation in the Human Rights Committee. See 
also Cuban Obligation to Accept Returning Nationals, 4b Op. O.L.C. 677, 678 (1980) (referring to the 
Covenant in analysis of the 1980 Cuban refugee crisis). 
6. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 7 (prohibiting “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”). 
7. Id. art. 8. 
8. Id. art. 18. 
9. Id. art. 21. 
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situations implicate rights inhabitants of the United States cannot enforce under 
the Covenant.  
Perhaps change is possible. One organization that closely follows human 
rights implementation in the United States notes that “international human rights 
laws have not played a major role in legal efforts to pursue fundamental rights, 
justice, and equality in the United States,” but, it continues, “[t]hat trend has 
begun to change.”10 In the Supreme Court over the past decade, international 
human rights law and practice have informed the outcomes of cases involving the 
trial of terrorism suspects at Guantánamo Bay,11 the application of capital 
punishment,12 and sexual activity among same-sex couples.13 State cases have also 
referred to human rights norms from time to time.14 Still, despite this increasing 
reference in high courts, individuals in the United States may not rely on ratified 
human rights treaties to limit or remedy state behavior that is inconsistent with 
human rights law.  
Absent a formal foothold in American legal institutions, the ICCPR will 
continue to play a secondary role, at best, in the enforcement of human rights law 
in the United States. At the same time, the United States will remain more an 
observer than a participant in the development of human rights jurisprudence 
worldwide. Congress will not implement the ICCPR, in all likelihood, and state 
and federal courts are unlikely to give the Covenant legal effect in the absence of 
legislative reform to bring ratified human rights treaties within the universe of 
enforceable international rules. Unless there is some change at the federal or state 
level, the Covenant will continue to be consigned to a twilight status in the United 
States, a body of law to which the nation is bound but that has no domestic effect. 
This Essay proposes rethinking the implementation of the Covenant by 
concentrating not on federal measures but on incorporation at the state level. 
Instead of encouraging Washington to adopt law applicable at the federal and state 
 
10. THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATE COURTS 2011, at 2 (2011), 
available at http://opportunityagenda.org/files/field_file/2011.08.25%20Human%20Rights%20in 
%20State%20Courts%202011%20FINAL.pdf. 
11. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006) (plurality opinion looking to the ICCPR to 
interpret fair trial obligations under the Geneva Conventions). 
12. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005) (referring to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and ICCPR prohibitions of capital punishment for juveniles under eighteen years old at the 
time of their offense). 
13. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (referring to the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights). 
14. See THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, supra note 10, at 7–56 (reviewing state court uses of 
international human rights law). For a prominent example of state court citation to human rights law, 
see In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 426 n.41 (Cal. 2008) (“It is noteworthy that the California and 
federal Constitutions are not alone in recognizing that the right to marry is not properly viewed as 
simply a benefit or privilege that a government may establish or abolish as it sees fit, but rather that 
the right constitutes a basic civil or human right of all people.”). 
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levels, a rather quixotic venture, advocates should look to the states15 not only as a 
partial solution to non-implementation of the ICCPR but also as the principal 
institutions that can test state practice according to the standards of human rights 
law.16 Others have urged and reflected on state and local engagement in human 
rights issues.17 Rather than focus on issue-specific legal change or narrow 
administrative efforts, which have limited impact, states should directly 
incorporate human rights treaties as a matter of state law, giving litigants the 
opportunity to rely upon the provisions of treaty law to supply human rights 
causes of action or to legitimize interpretive guidance in cases arising from state or 
federal causes of action. I take the example of the ICCPR as the avatar for 
incorporation of human rights law at the state level, but the same arguments could 
be made for other ratified treaties.18 
Part I of this Essay introduces the problem of human rights treaty 
enforcement in the United States. It begins with an overview of the Covenant, 
followed by an examination of the U.S. ratification of the ICCPR, drawing 
especially from the exchanges between the executive branch and the Senate in 
1979 and 1991, when the Covenant was under Senate consideration for advice and 
consent to ratification. I focus especially on how federalism concerns shaped the 
ratification instrument. I also look at how the ratification process demonstrates 
the competing desires of the United States to take advantage of the political 
 
15. This Essay uses two meanings of “state” or “states”—either the constitutive elements of 
the American federal system (the fifty states) or as the principal subjects of international law, the 
nation-state. The former, of course, do not formally ratify treaties under international law, though 
they may be involved in their implementation. The latter do and, when they do, bear obligations to 
adhere to the terms of the treaties. These are obviously different uses of the terms and should be 
evident according to the context in which they are used. 
16. This would be a partial solution because I do not propose a federal initiative to enable 
individuals to enforce ICCPR claims against the federal government. I am focusing solely on state-
level implementation in this Essay, acknowledging that testing U.S. compliance with the ICCPR 
depends upon implementation at the federal level as well. 
17. See infra notes 92, 95. The furthest reaching argument in the field of state implementation 
of human rights law, as far as I am aware, is Peter Spiro’s 1997 proposal that states, as subnational 
actors, become parties to human rights treaties. Spiro, supra note 5, at 590–95. I am unaware of any 
state actor taking up the suggestion. 
18. Among other human rights treaties, the United States has also ratified the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, S. EXEC. DOC. O, 
81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 
[hereinafter CERD], and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85 [hereinafter CAT]. The United States has not ratified other such treaties, such as the ICCPR’s 
sibling treaty, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW], the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Mar. 30, 2007, 25 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter CRPD], and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]. 
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benefits of ratification internationally, while not allowing treaties to become a tool 
for national legislation by imposing their direct obligations on the states.  
Part II looks at federal and state treatment of the ICCPR in the United 
States. There may be some bright spots in both federal and state courts. However, 
the federal government and state and local actors have been more eager to deploy 
human rights law to change behavior of “bad actors” abroad than to enforce 
human rights norms domestically. 
In Part III, I focus on the suggestion originally made in the Senate but 
echoed by scholars in the years since: while the United States has international 
obligations under the ICCPR and other human rights treaties, it is “up to the 
states” to determine how to implement the provisions of the Covenant.19 I lay out 
the broad outlines of an approach in which the states incorporate the ICCPR as a 
matter of state law and provide litigants with the opportunity to rely upon its 
provisions as binding law in state courts. I identify some of the likely arguments 
for and against such incorporation, concluding that it would advance human rights 
protection domestically and U.S. policy internationally.  
Simply to posit that state execution of the Covenant advances U.S. human 
rights commitments will not be enough to make it happen. State legislators will 
need to be persuaded that the ICCPR can advance the state’s own commitment to 
human rights principles in ways that are consistent with other state policies. 
Advocates from state to state will need to evaluate the likely impact of state 
execution on key areas of state law. And many areas of state governance could be 
implicated, from prison conditions to capital punishment, police behavior to 
family law, nondiscrimination and equality to profiling, rights to political 
participation, and many areas beyond—all areas, in any event, under the 
jurisdiction of the states and subject to their enforcement. It is beyond the scope 
of this Essay to lay out how the ICCPR could implicate state policies across the 
board, but any steps taken to execute the Covenant at the state level will have to 
begin with that kind of careful assessment. This Essay instead looks at the 
framework of the Covenant and its ratification by the United States in order to 
show that state execution should be considered a viable path toward U.S. 
implementation of the ICCPR.20 
 
19. See, e.g., Ex. C, D, E, and F, 95-2—Four Treaties Related to Human Rights: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong. 54 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Hearing] (“The Departments of State 
and Justice recommended reservations in these few instances [where human rights treaties diverged 
from U.S. law] so as to leave to the federal and state legislatures decisions as to whether such 
legislative changes should be undertaken. At a time of concern that the executive branch excessively 
encroaches upon legislative prerogatives, it was felt that these issues of domestic policy were best left 
in the hands of both Houses of Congress and the state legislatures.”). Julian Ku and John Yoo echo 
this point. See JULIAN KU & JOHN YOO, TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 175 (2012). 
20. Even state execution would leave open application of the ICCPR to federal actors. Federal 
execution should remain on the agenda of human rights organizations, but given the Senate’s repeated 
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I. THE ICCPR AND FEDERALISM 
A. Obligations Under the ICCPR 
The Covenant is one of the most widely ratified instruments in international 
law, with 167 states parties.21 It provides “a common, minimum standard” across 
a range of substantive norms, and a ratifying state “assumes international legal 
obligations to other states, undertaking to respect and ensure the human rights of 
its inhabitants through its own constitutional-legal system.”22 As with other 
multilateral human rights treaties, the ICCPR contains substantive provisions, 
some of which detail treaty purposes and principles of interpretation, while others 
specify particular rules: structural provisions related to monitoring and 
enforcement, and procedural rules pertaining to application, relationship to other 
international legal norms, entry into force, and related subjects.  
Part I of the Covenant, consisting only of Article 1, is the sole provision to 
deal with the rights of “peoples” (not of individuals), providing for the right to 
self-determination and the right of sovereignty over natural resources.23 As a 
collective right, it does not fit the model of individual guarantees, which are the 
principal object and purpose of the Covenant. The preamble of the Covenant, for 
instance, deals only with “the inherent dignity of the human person,” “the ideal of 
free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom,” and “the individual” 
relationship to other persons and the community.24 In this context, Article 1 
appears out of place and, in any event, not a natural fit for state incorporation. 
Part II, consisting of Articles 2 through 5, provides basic principles to guide 
interpretation and application of the Covenant. Three are particularly important to 
identify. First, Article 2(1) and Article 3 enshrine principles of nondiscrimination 
and gender equality in the application of the rights under the Covenant, consistent 
with equal protection provisions of U.S. Constitutional law.25  
 
resistance to human rights treaty implementation, I imagine that such a process is unlikely to bear 
fruit for quite some time. 
21. Up-to-date ratification numbers may be found on the U.N. Treaty Series website at http:// 
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV4&chapter=4&lang=en. It also 
bears noting that, of course, ratification itself does not indicate whether a state actually complies with 
the treaty. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 
1940 (2002). 
22. Louis Henkin, International Human Rights Standards in National Law: The Jurisprudence of the 
United States, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 189, 189 
(Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni, eds., 1997). 
23. An illuminating discussion of the history of this provision and its development as a 
collective right, as opposed to the individual rights detailed throughout the Covenant, may be found 
in MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 
6–25 (1993). 
24. ICCPR, supra note 1, pmbl. 
25. Article 2(1) provides,  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
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Second, Article 2(2) obligates states parties to ensure that, “[w]here not 
already provided for by existing legislative or other measures,” they “give effect to 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” Article 2(3) goes a step further 
and obligates states parties to provide a remedy in the case of violations of rights 
under the Covenant, whether that remedy be provided by “judicial, administrative, 
or legislative authorities.” Steiner, Alston, and Goodman argue, “How states fulfil 
[sic] these obligations lies within their discretion; they are not obligated to 
incorporate the treaty as such within their domestic legal order . . . .”26 Stated 
another way, states parties must provide individuals within their jurisdictions with 
an “effective remedy,” but they may decide whether that remedy takes a judicial, 
administrative, or legislative character, or some combination of those approaches. 
Failure to provide any effective remedy, in any form, would amount to a violation 
of the Covenant.27 
Third, Article 4 enables states parties to derogate from certain provisions of 
the Covenant “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation.”28 Such derogations must nonetheless comply with the nondiscrimination 
principles of the Covenant and must be strictly tailored to the exigency. 
Part IV (Articles 28 through 45) deals with the creation of the Covenant’s 
monitoring body, the Human Rights Committee.29 The Committee’s eighteen 
experts, elected from among candidates put forward by ICCPR states parties, 
review government reports and complaints on the implementation of (or 
noncompliance with) the Covenant. They also review individual claims of 
noncompliance in situations where a state party has accepted the jurisdiction of 
the Committee to do so under an Optional Protocol.30  
Part V (Articles 46 and 47) deals with the relationship of the Covenant to the 
United Nations and the principle of sovereignty over natural resources (the latter 
seeming out of place in this Covenant, and perhaps a more natural fit for the 
ICESCR).  
 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Id. art. 2. It thus also indicates the jurisdictional scope of the treaty. Article 3 provides, “The States 
Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.” Id. art. 3. 
26. HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1135 (3d ed. 
2008). 
27. See David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations 
and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 142–43 (1999). 
28. ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 2–5. 
29. Id. arts. 28-45. 
30. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302. The United States is not a party to the Optional Protocol and thus does not 
accept the Committee’s jurisdiction over individual communications alleging U.S. noncompliance 
with the Covenant. 
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Part VI (Articles 48 through 53) deals with basic principles concerning the 
entry into force, amendment, and other procedural elements of the Covenant.31 It 
does contain one provision relevant to state execution: Article 50 provides, “The 
provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States 
without limitations or exceptions.” Article 50 was the subject of debate during the 
Covenant’s negotiations, when the United States advocated for language that 
would require the federal government merely to bring the Covenant’s obligations 
to the attention of state authorities.32 In response to this provision as adopted, 
however, the United States instead ratified on the understanding that 
implementation would be accomplished according to principles of American 
federalism.33 
Part III (Articles 6 through 27) contains the heart of the Covenant. Most of 
the substantive obligations under the Covenant implicate behavior at all levels of 
government, federal, state, and local. While a review of the provisions in 
significant detail is beyond the scope of this Essay, key guarantees include the 
following: 
Three provisions deal with basic, peremptory rights under international 
human rights law. Article 6 protects the right to life, focusing in particular on 
arbitrary deprivation of life. It does not prohibit capital punishment but seeks to 
assert boundaries so that the death penalty is applied narrowly according to well-
understood rules of law.34 Article 7 protects individuals from being “subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” including 
nonconsensual “medical or scientific experimentation.” Yoram Dinstein noted 
that the torture prohibition, widely found in international law, “may even have 
acquired the lineament of a peremptory norm of general international law, i.e., jus 
cogens.”35 While the elements of torture are “beyond dispute,” however, there may 
be less agreement concerning the precise dividing point between torture and cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment.36 Among other peremptory norms, the 
Covenant also provides, in Article 8, for the freedom from slavery and other 
forms of servitude. This prohibition includes “forced or compulsory labor.”37 
 
31. ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 46–53. 
32. See NOWAK, supra note 23, at 636–37; Pechota, supra note 3, at 49–50. 
33. I discuss the “federalism understanding” infra Part I.B. 
34. See Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, 114, 114–37. 
Under the Covenant, the “right to life” is not understood to refer to the political term used to signify 
opposition to abortion, as it does in the United States. See id. at 122. Instead, “right to life” generally 
refers to killings authorized by official actors. See, e.g., SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 154–93 (2nd ed. 2004); see also id. at 193 (“The 
[Human Rights Committee] has confirmed that abortion is compatible with article 6 . . . .”). 
35. Dinstein, supra note 34, at 122. 
36. Id. at 123–24. 
37. See NOWAK, supra note 23, at 143–57; Dinstein, supra note 34, at 126–28. 
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Several provisions guarantee minimum standards within the law enforcement 
and justice systems of a state. For instance, Article 9 protects against “arbitrary 
arrest or detention,” and seeks to ensure that arrests are undertaken in accordance 
with basic principles of due process.38 Article 10 deals with humane conditions of 
detention,39 and Articles 14 and 15 deal with minimum fair trial guarantees.40 
Related provisions deal more generally with rights of recognition in courts of law 
(Article 16)41 and equal protection and non-discrimination (Articles 24 and 26).42  
While the preceding rights serve to protect the individual’s physical integrity, 
another set of provisions guarantees rights of self-expression, conscience, and 
political engagement. For example, Article 17 protects privacy in the home and 
family,43 Article 18 protects freedom of “thought, conscience, and religion,”44 and 
Article 19 protects the right to hold opinions and to give them voice through free 
expression.45 Article 20 prohibits “any propaganda for war” and “advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred,”46 but the United States adopted a reservation 
since the provision regulates speech protected under the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.47 Articles 21 and 22 protect rights of association and 
assembly.48 Article 25 provides for a right to participate in the political life of one’s 
country.49 Article 27 aims to protect the right of members of minorities to express 
themselves through cultural, linguistic, and religious means.50 
Finally, the Covenant contains a set of provisions relating to family, spousal, 
and children’s rights.51 Article 23 provides that “[t]he family is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the 
State.” As Manfred Nowak explains, however, this provision gives states “broad 
 
38. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 9. See generally Haji N.A. Noor Muhammad, Due Process of Law for 
Persons Accused of Crime, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, 138, 147–65. 
39. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 10. 
40. Id. arts. 14–15. 
41. Id. art. 16. 
42. Id. arts. 24, 26. 
43. Id. art. 17. 
44. Id. art. 18. 
45. Id. art. 19. 
46. Id. art. 20. 
47. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing on S. 478 Before the Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 102nd Cong. 1, at 8 (1991). 
48. ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 21–22. 
49. Id. art. 25. See generally Karl Josef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political 
Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS, supra note 3, 209; see also NOWAK, supra note 23, at 336 (“Freedom of opinion and 
expression is not infrequently termed the core of the Covenant and the touchstone for all other rights 
guaranteed therein. . . . It unites civil and political rights into a harmonious whole.”). 
50. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 27. 
51. ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 23–24. 
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discretion in regulating the law of marriage and family in accordance with the 
respective social and cultural concepts.”52  
The substantive provisions of the Covenant do not comprise a code of 
specific rules to guide the conduct of official authorities. The ICCPR provides a 
floor below which states parties may not go in their protection of individual rights, 
subject to reservations that ratifying states may attach, provided that they do not 
contradict the object and purpose of the treaty. In this context, the Human Rights 
Committee, regional human rights courts, and domestic courts around the world 
interpret these provisions in accordance with specific cases set before them. None 
of these parties binds another to a particular interpretation, but the process of 
transnational judging, in which interpreters look beyond their jurisdictions to 
understand specific rules, means that the participants in that process have the 
opportunity to influence and to be influenced by one another.53 Undoubtedly such 
a process leads to common understandings of the meaning of the provisions 
among those participating in ICCPR interpretation, or at least to common 
understandings of the terms of the debate over such rules. 
B. Federalism and the Ratification of the ICCPR 
Governments concluded the negotiations of the ICCPR under the auspices 
of the United Nations in 1966. Twenty-five years later, in 1991, a unanimous 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee—including well-known liberals and 
conservatives, such as Alan Cranston and Joe Biden on the left and Mitch 
McConnell and Jesse Helms on the right—recommended that the Senate provide 
its advice and consent to the ratification of the Covenant.54 In the words of 
President George H.W. Bush when his administration submitted the treaty to the 
Senate for its approval, the ICCPR “codifies the essential freedoms people must 
enjoy in a democratic society” and, apart from several exceptions to which the 
United States entered reservations or understandings, “is entirely consonant with 
the fundamental principles incorporated in our own Bill of Rights.”55 The Senate 
ultimately approved the ICCPR in executive session without objection.56 
 
52. NOWAK, supra note 23, at 402–03; see also JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 34, at 587 (noting that 
the Human Rights Committee “clearly gives States a certain cultural leeway in determining the 
definition of ‘family’ for the purposes of article 23”). 
53. See Lawrence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 358–59 (1997). 
54. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 3 (1992). 
55. S. EXEC. COMM. REP., 102D CONG., S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REP. ON INT’L 
LAW, APP. A, TRANSMITTAL LETTER FROM PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH (Aug. 8, 1991) (1992), 
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 660 [hereinafter BUSH TRANSMITTAL LETTER]. 
56. 138 CONG. REC. 8068–71 (1992); see also David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 
42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1993). 
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Embedded within the ratification of the ICCPR is this important question 
for the United States: In a treaty designed to protect individuals against the abuses 
or excesses of governmental authorities at all levels, how should its provisions be 
implemented by state and local governments, where individuals arguably have the 
most contact with officials? The ICCPR itself demands an answer, since Article 50 
extends its provisions to “all parts of federal States”57 and Article 2 obligates states 
parties “to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”58 States 
parties have discretion to determine the best domestic legal form “to give effect” 
to the provisions of the ICCPR.59 The Covenant does not, however, countenance 
doing nothing. 
When the Covenant first appeared before the Senate in 1979, the 
administration of President Jimmy Carter approached federalism issues delicately 
and preemptively. A representative of the Department of Justice noted in a 
hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the administration 
“did not want to be inadvertently federalizing additional subjects through the 
treaty process.”60 The Carter administration thus proposed a series of reservations, 
understandings, and declarations (RUDs) that would make clear to the Senate that 
ratification would not require any change in existing U.S. law, either because U.S. 
law was already in conformity with the Covenant or because the RUDs would 
limit the extent to which the United States was accepting Covenant obligations.61 
The Carter administration, and later the Bush administration, also proposed RUDs 
to assure conservative skeptics that existing law need not be changed in several 
areas. For instance, both administrations proposed reservations in the area of 
capital punishment so as to preserve the practice of the juvenile death penalty. 
They also proposed a reservation to the provision prohibiting cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in order to equate the terms with “cruel and 
unusual punishment” under the U.S. Constitution. The administration proposed 
 
57. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 50. 
58. Id. art. 2. 
59. Oscar Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 
3, 311, 313–15. 
60. See 1979 Hearing, supra note 19, at 37 (statement of Jack Goldklang, Attorney Adviser, 
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice). 
61. Presidential Statement on Human Rights Treaties 1978, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
395 (Feb. 23, 1978) [hereinafter Carter Transmittal]. As noted above, for instance, in the case of First 
Amendment protections of expression, a reservation was required to preclude legal effect for 
Covenant Article 20’s prohibition of “propaganda for war” and forms of incitement of 
discrimination. A key difference between the ICCPR and U.S. law is that Article 20 of the ICCPR 
prohibits “propaganda for war” and “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.” ICCPR, supra note 1, art 20. The First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution would clearly prohibit the adoption and enforcement of laws 
designed for these purposes. U.S. CONST. amend. I. As a result, the United States ratified the ICCPR 
subject to a reservation that precluded implementation of Article 20. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102–23, 
at 10–11 (1992). 
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other RUDs to preserve U.S. law in the areas of post-offense reductions in 
penalties, treatment of juveniles as adults where deemed warranted, equal 
protection law, right to compensation, segregated treatment of the accused, and 
right to counsel.62 The reservations have had a definite impact. For instance, the 
Supreme Court of Nevada disallowed a death row inmate from invoking the 
ICCPR on the grounds that “the Senate’s express reservation of the United States’ 
right to impose a penalty of death on juvenile offenders negates [the petitioner’s] 
claim that he was illegally sentenced.”63 
When the Senate took up the ICCPR fourteen years later, having failed to 
complete the process of advice and consent in 1979, Senator Jesse Helms, among 
the leading conservatives in the Senate at the time,64 expressed concern not only 
about the substantive provisions of the Covenant and the possibility of its political 
use against the United States.65 He also argued that the ICCPR “calls into 
question . . . even the Federal/State structure of our legal system.”66 
The Bush administration urged ratification on the basis of the same sets of 
RUDs proposed by the Carter administration, hoping to bring Senator Helms and 
his allies aboard the ratification train. It also proposed, following again from the 
Carter submission, that the Senate provide advice and consent on the basis of an 
understanding that 
this Convention shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the 
extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters 
covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments; to the 
extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such 
matters, the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the 
Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of the state or 
 
62. See Carter Transmittal, supra note 61. 
63. Domingues v. Nevada, 961 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Nev. 1998). 
64. See generally WILLIAM LINK, RIGHTEOUS WARRIOR: JESSE HELMS AND THE RISE OF 
MODERN CONSERVATISM (2008). It is not precise enough to put the label of conservative on those 
who, like Helms, opposed human rights treaties. As Michael Ignatieff has put it most succinctly, “The 
same politicians who wielded states’ rights arguments against the use of federal power to desegregate 
the South invoked national sovereignty arguments to resist adoption or implementation of 
international rights regimes.” Michael Ignatieff, Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, 
in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 19 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
65. See International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 102nd Cong. 1 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Hearing] (statement of Sen. Helms). The interruption 
of the treaty ratification process during the Carter Administration resulted from major foreign 
distractions in late 1979. The hearings for the Covenant, for instance, took place less than two weeks 
after the Iranian takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran and subsequent hostage crisis. Soon 
after, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan triggered a major Cold War crisis. As a 
result, ratification was undoubtedly not among the Senate’s key priorities. Regardless, the Reagan 
administration did not pursue ratification once it came into office in January of 1981. 
66. Id. at 7. 
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local governments may take appropriated [sic] measures for the 
fulfillment of the Convention.67 
This “federalism understanding,” as it came to be known, became part of the 
U.S. instrument of ratification. The Committee’s explanation of the understanding 
notes that it means “to emphasize domestically that there is no intent to alter the 
constitutional balance of authority between the State and Federal governments or 
to use the provisions of the Covenant to ‘federalize’ matters now within the 
competence of the States.”68  
As Brad Roth explains, the understanding was “intended to disable the 
ratification from enhancing federal power at the expense of the states, thereby to 
overcome some of the qualms that for fifteen years denied the treaty the needed 
margin in the Senate.”69 However, nothing in the ratification instrument clarifies 
what state or local measures may be appropriate in implementation of the 
Covenant. One way to interpret such silence is that the President and Senate 
believed that states enjoy broad discretion to define what steps would be 
appropriate. There is a hint that the federal government would take some steps to 
encourage implementation at the state level, but the overall thrust of the 
understanding is that Washington would not seek to influence state consideration 
of how to implement the Covenant.  
The ratification of the ICCPR advanced a contested brand of federalism in 
which the treaty power may not extend to state law,70 but it did not respond to the 
substantive requirements of the treaty, since there was no articulation of what 
measures might have been “appropriate” in a federal system. Nor has the federal 
government adopted measures to encourage states to take action to implement the 
obligations under the ICCPR.71 The apparent disingenuousness of the federalism 
understanding seems to be by design, as the United States declared upon 
ratification that “existing U.S. law generally complies with the Covenant” and that 
“implementing legislation [was] not contemplated.”72 It also declared the ICCPR 
to be non-self-executing, noting that “the Covenant will not create a private cause 
 
67. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 23 (1992). A virtually identical understanding was adopted 
with respect to the CAT, supra note 18, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 2–3, and the CERD, supra 
note 18, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 103-29, at 25. 
68. 1991 Hearing, supra note 65. The Committee added that an understanding was preferable to 
a reservation to Article 50 of the Covenant, “since the intent is not to modify or limit U.S. 
undertakings under the Covenant but rather to put our future treaty partners on notice with regard to 
the implications of our federal system concerning implementation.” Id. at 125. 
69. Roth, supra note 5, at 907. 
70. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 
89 AM. INT’L LAW J. 341, 345–46 (1995). 
71. As Julian Ku and John Yoo put it, “The federalism understandings suggest that the states 
are responsible for treaty obligations that are beyond the scope of Congress’s Article I powers.” KU & 
YOO, supra note 19, at 175. But, they continue, “no state appears to have expressly passed legislation 
for the purpose of implementing U.S. international human rights treaty obligations.” Id. 
72. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 19 (1992). 
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of action in U.S. courts.”73 Thus, the federalism understanding offers no 
mechanism to encourage state implementation. 
Soon after President Carter submitted the Covenant to the Senate for advice 
and consent, along with the package of RUDs that would ultimately attach to the 
U.S. ratification, Professor Oscar Schachter argued that the U.S. RUDs as a whole 
undermined the Covenant. He wrote, 
The critical legal issue raised is not whether specific reservations are 
admissible. It is rather whether a whole series of reservations admittedly 
designed to avoid any need to modify United States law can be regarded 
as in conformity with the object and purpose of the Covenant, especially 
with the “obligation of means” assumed in Article 2. The object of 
Article 2 was to require all parties to adopt measures wherever necessary 
to give effect to the Covenant. The proposed U.S. bundle of reservations 
is intended to deprive that requirement of any effect whatsoever for the 
United States. It would do so by reducing the obligations of the United 
States under the Covenant to the level of existing United States law so 
that it would be under no requirement to adopt any measures to modify 
existing domestic law.74  
This all begs the question: If the United States intended the ICCPR to have 
no effect on U.S. law and not to enable individuals to test the proposition that 
U.S. law was already in conformity with the Covenant, why ratify? One possibility 
is that ratification would provide a tool for federal, state, and local actors to ensure 
compliance with human rights law at an administrative level. The willingness of 
the United States to report to the Human Rights Committee on U.S. practice 
under the ICCPR may provide some support for that notion, as reporting involves 
substantial engagement with state and local actors to assess the steps they are 
taking in conformity with the Covenant.75 There is, however, little evidence in the 
ratification record itself to support this as a principal, or even incidental, objective 
of ratification. 
Rather, the Carter and Bush administrations supported ratification 
specifically to enhance the influence the United States might exercise 
internationally as a party to the Covenant. When submitting the Covenant to the 
Senate, President Carter, who had made human rights a central element of his 
foreign policy rhetoric,76 bemoaned the fact that America’s non-party status 
 
73. 1991 Hearing, supra note 65, at 14. For an insightful analysis of the meaning of non-self-
execution in the human rights context, see Sloss, supra note 27, at 148, 153–69. 
74. Schachter, supra note 59, 321–22. 
75. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNEX A TO THE COMMON CORE DOCUMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL, AND TERRITORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS 
AND PROGRAMS (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/179782.htm (Annex submitted to 
the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR). 
76. See JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
29–31 (2d ed. 2008). 
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“prejudices United States participation in the development of the international law 
of human rights.”77 Later, following the Iranian assault on the American Embassy 
in Tehran and the holding of American hostages there, President Carter added, 
“Regimes with whom we raise human rights concerns will no longer be able to 
blunt the force of our approaches or question the seriousness of our commitment 
by pointing to our failure to ratify.”78 President Bush updated this purpose, 
situating ratification in the context of U.S. assistance to countries emerging from 
communist rule in the Eastern bloc. Bush said that ratification “would underscore 
our natural commitment to fostering democratic values through international 
law.”79 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee echoed President Bush but took 
the argument further. For one thing, the Committee noted that by accepting the 
competence of the Human Rights Committee to hear state-to-state complaints of 
noncompliance, the United States would enjoy “an opportunity to play a more 
aggressive role in the process of enforcing compliance with the Covenant.”80 Even 
beyond such concrete influence, the Committee members believed that ratification 
would offer the United States “greater effectiveness in the process of shaping 
international norms and behavior in the area of human rights.”81 
The possibility of external influence may provide a valid reason for 
ratification of the Covenant and other human rights treaties. U.S. ratification and 
participation in the Human Rights Committee may advance the U.S. human rights 
role globally, as it suggests that the United States is willing to be monitored by the 
Committee even as it challenges others’ human rights violations. However, in the 
years since Senate consideration of the Covenant, other institutions and actors 
have emerged to compete for human rights influence with the United States, 
which played a key role during the Cold War.82 Since the early 1990s, for instance, 
the European Union has exercised its substantial economic power to condition 
relationships and EU membership on human rights behavior of other 
governments.83 At the same time, regional human rights courts—especially the 
European and Inter-American courts of human rights—strongly shape the 
 
77. Carter Transmittal, supra note 61. 
78. 1979 Hearing, supra note 19, at 453 (letter from President Carter to Senator Frank Church, 
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nov. 30, 1979). 
79. BUSH TRANSMITTAL LETTER, supra note 55. 
80. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 3 (1992). 
81. Id. at 4. 
82. See John Gerard Ruggie, American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism, and Global Governance, 
in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 64, 304, 307. 
83. See, e.g., LORAND BARTELS, EUR. PARLIAMENT’S COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 
THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY IN THE EU’S BILATERAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS AND OTHER TRADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES 1–10 (2008); see also 
Frank Schimmelfennig et al., Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality 
on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, 41 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 495, 495–99 (2003). 
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interpretation of the norms under the ICCPR.84 Even though American law 
continues to have influence overseas, the United States has a limited ability to add 
to the interpretation of human rights norms because of their limited use at the 
federal and state levels.85 
As a result, even with respect to the key argument for ratification of the 
ICCPR, times have changed in such a way as to limit American influence. One 
possible way to insert American experience back into the human rights 
mainstream—with the likelihood not only of having our law influenced by the 
norms under the Covenant but also of having our courts influencing the 
interpretation of those same norms—would be to open up pathways toward 
significant U.S. engagement with human rights norms in American courts. 
II. LIMITED FEDERAL AND STATE ACTION UNDER THE ICCPR 
At the time of U.S. approval of the Covenant, Michael Posner and Peter 
Spiro argued that ratification “marked a milestone in this country’s long history as 
a guardian of human rights,” but its domestic reach would be limited.86 The 
subsequent history of federal and state treatment of the ICCPR has proven their 
prediction to be correct. 
The ratification instrument all but guaranteed two results: first, because the 
ICCPR is non-self-executing under American law, federal and state courts do not 
entertain private rights of action that may arise under it. This is not to say that the 
Covenant has been of no value to litigants in domestic cases. The Supreme Court 
and domestic courts have referred to the principles of the Covenant (and other 
human rights treaties) in the context of constitutional adjudication.87 Even in 
those cases, however, the Court has emphasized that the rules of international law 
themselves provide only secondary support in constitutional interpretation. As the 
Court put it in Graham v. Florida, a case concerning the application to a juvenile 
defendant of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole, “The 
judgments of other nations and the international community are not dispositive as 
to the meaning of the Eight Amendment. . . . [However,] [t]he Court has looked 
 
84. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; see also American Convention on Human Rights art. 33, 
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
85. For an interesting analysis of diminishing U.S. constitutional influence, see David S. Law 
& Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2012). 
86. Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States Ratification of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights: The International Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1209, 
1209 (1993); see also John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy 
Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1297–98 (1993). 
87. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
576 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 838 (1988) (holding application of death penalty to be unconstitutional as applied to a defendant 
who was fifteen years old at the time of the killing); Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 830 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(referring to ICCPR prohibition on arbitrary arrest and detention). 
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beyond our Nation’s borders for support for its independent conclusion that a 
particular punishment is cruel and unusual.”88 Yet conservative justices strongly 
resist such uses of international law, arguing that international human rights 
treaties may not be used as an instrument of constitutional interpretation in any 
way.89 The future of even such secondary uses of the ICCPR, therefore, is highly 
contingent on the makeup of the Court. 
Second, the Senate approved the ICCPR on the understanding, noted above, 
that U.S. law already complied with the Covenant’s provisions—and that where it 
did not, the United States attached RUDs. As a result, with some marginal 
exceptions, the United States has not implemented the Covenant domestically in 
any meaningful way. At the international level, U.S. participation in the Human 
Rights Committee has been robust, and key principles in human rights law frame 
the annual human rights report of the State Department.90 The Clinton 
administration adopted an executive order on the implementation of human rights 
treaties, creating an interagency federal working group to promote the ICCPR and 
other ratified instruments.91 The group’s role appeared limited to interagency 
discussions of human rights issues “and the preparation of reports to international 
monitoring bodies,” but even so, the George W. Bush administration, soon after 
coming into office in 2001, abolished it.92 
Advocates of the ICCPR and other treaties in the United States have made 
efforts to change the domestic narrative of resistance to human rights treaty 
enforcement to one of implementation. They can claim some successes. For 
instance, at the federal level, legislative initiatives have resulted in such laws as the 
Torture Victim Protection Act, which enforces elements of the Convention 
Against Torture, the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, and the 
War Crimes Act of 1996, which implements obligations under certain international 
humanitarian law treaties.93 Since the landmark Second Circuit Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS) decision in 1980, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,94 advocates on behalf of the victims 
 
88. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010). 
89. See id. at 2045 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
90. The annual Human Rights Reports of the U.S. State Department, for instance, are 
structured country-by-country around the basic norms of international human rights law. Thus, they 
include sections on the protection of the integrity of the person (including torture, detention, and fair 
trial), respect for civil liberties (including expression and association rights), political rights, and 
discrimination, among other headings. See Human Rights Reports, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state 
.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/index.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). 
91. Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (Dec. 10, 1998). 
92. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 971 (2d ed. 2009). 
93. See War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006)); Torture Victims Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 
106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)); Genocide Convention Implementation Act 
of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), Pub. L. No. 100-606, 102 Stat. 3045 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1091–1092 (2006)). For other federal statutes implementing human rights norms, see 
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 92, at 979–81. 
94. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
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of serious human rights abuses have sought, with considerable success, to bring 
the human rights claims of aliens under federal court jurisdiction.95 
Yet even with the success of ATS litigation in bringing human rights claims 
to U.S. courts, American citizens cannot rely on human rights treaties or 
customary international human rights law to pursue claims in federal court against 
American governmental authorities. If a customary norm were to be codified as a 
matter of U.S. law, litigants might then be in a position to rely on such a norm in 
U.S. courts. In other words, legislative incorporation could change the international 
law dynamic in the United States, whereas the judiciary is unlikely to effect change 
in this area on its own.96 A number of scholars and activists continue to seek to 
remedy the nonapplication of human rights treaties at the federal level. Some 
propose that the federal government change its law and policy to improve the 
treatment of human rights treaties in federal courts or even permit human rights 
litigation at the federal level.97 
Echoing the treatment of human rights treaties at the federal level, some 
state courts refer positively to international human rights law.98 By and large, 
however, states have given human rights treaties a limited profile and impact. One 
survey found that, as of June 2010, only 187 opinions in state courts have ever 
cited to the eight leading human rights instruments.99 The opinions, moreover, 
show that state courts “have generally been dismissive of the claim that they are 
bound by even the ratified instruments.”100 Similarly, the Court of Appeal of 
 
95. Success under the ATS has become more difficult over the years, particularly in the wake 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2003). See Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-01491, 132 S. Ct. 1738 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2012) (additional arguments 
set for Oct. 1, 2012). The ATS cases have provided the principal arena for discussion of human rights 
norms in U.S. courts and thus attract substantial attention in the literature. They generally address 
different sorts of questions than would be posed by ICCPR litigation in state court. ATS litigation has 
triggered a debate over the role of customary international law in federal courts; by contrast, ICCPR 
litigation would require interpretation of conventional law (i.e., a ratified U.S. treaty). 
96. Bradley and Goldsmith suggest this result. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
815, 827–31 (1997). 
97. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway et al., International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 
37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 54 (2012) (offering “three proposals for how each of the branches of the 
federal government can strengthen the enforcement of international law”); Penny M. Venetis, Making 
Human Rights Treaty Law Actionable in the United States: The Case for Universal Implementing Legislation, 
63 ALA. L. REV. 97, 148 (2011) (proposing congressional action to remove reservations, 
understandings and declarations under ratified human rights treaties and enabling litigation under 
them in federal courts). See generally Posner & Spiro, supra note 86, for a concrete proposal to 
implement the ICCPR at the federal level. 
98. THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, supra note 10, at 1; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 
426 n.41 (Cal. 2008). 
99. Johanna Kalb, Human Rights Treaties in State Courts: The International Prospects of State 
Constitutionalism after Medellín, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1051, 1056 n.23 (2011) (referring to the ICCPR, 
CAT, CRC, Genocide Convention, CEDAW, ICESCR, CERD, and Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)). 
100. Id. at 1059. 
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Florida said of the ICCPR in Graham, “Until the treaty is implemented through 
congressional action, it cannot act as a limitation on the powers of the Florida 
Legislature to determine the appropriate penalties for violations of the law.”101 A 
California court found the Florida opinion in Graham persuasive when it 
disallowed petitioners from claiming that their life sentences without the 
possibility of parole violated the ICCPR.102 Even when state courts cite human 
rights law approvingly, they do so not as a matter of binding authority but as 
secondary support for a domestic legal argument.103  
In the face of federal and state court resistance, a handful of states and 
municipalities have sought to integrate human rights norms in concrete ways. The 
City of San Francisco, for instance, requires municipal entities to operate in 
accordance with the principles of the unratified Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).104 Other municipal bodies around the 
country have followed San Francisco’s suit, with many calling for ratification of 
treaties such as CEDAW.105 Pennsylvania’s House of Representatives established 
a standing committee on the integration of human rights standards in state law 
and policy, though its impact on policy is uncertain, and Massachusetts’s 
legislature considered a similar bill.106 Several scholars have noticed that these 
moves bring international norms to the local level, building arguments about the 
value of local engagement with norms codified at the global level.107 
Generally, however, state legislatures and municipalities have not done much 
better than state courts in implementing human rights treaties. To be sure, entities 
 
101. Graham v. Florida, 982 So. 2d 43, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). The Supreme Court later 
overturned the state court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
102. People v. See, No. F055800, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10015, at *45 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Dec. 18, 2009). 
103. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 426 n.41 (Cal. 2008). 
104. See the discussions at Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent 
Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1641–43 (2006), and Gaylynn 
Burroughs, More Than an Incidental Effect on Foreign Affairs: Implementation of Human Rights by State and 
Local Governments, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 411, 416–17 (2006). 
105. Peggy Simpson, Chances Improve for Ratification of CEDAW, WOMEN’S MEDIA CENTER 
(Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.womensmediacenter.com/blog/entry/chances-improve-fo-ratification-
of-cedaw. 
106. See U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK, U.S. CERD OBLIGATIONS AND DOMESTIC 
IMPLEMENTATION (2008), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/usa/ 
USHRN7.doc. The text of the Massachusetts bill may be found at Citizens for Global Justice, 
California’s CEDAW Bill; New Massachusetts Human Rights Bill, 28 MINERVA, Feb. 2005, at 31, 32–33, 
available at http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/WFI-Minerva-Vol28.pdf. 
107. A number of scholars have explored the ways in which states may participate in the 
enforcement of international law in a wide variety of ways. Judith Resnik has trained her eye on 
human rights (CEDAW) and climate change (Kyoto), mapping the variety of ways in which 
municipal and state actors seek to integrate (or preclude) the application of international law. Resnik, 
supra note 105, at 1641–47; see also Martha Davis, Upstairs, Downstairs: Subnational Incorporation of 
International Human Rights Law at the End of an Era, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 435–38 (2009); Powell, 
supra note 5, at 262–73; see generally Kalb, supra note 99. 
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at the state and local level often monitor civil rights norms under the rubric of 
human rights. It is common for American states to have a “human rights” 
mechanism to monitor state and local behavior.108 Such monitoring mechanisms, 
however, are based on domestic law, generally without reference to norms under 
the ICCPR or other U.S. treaties.109 While actors at state and local levels 
occasionally aim to translate human rights treaty norms into concrete tools to 
guide governmental authority, the ICCPR and other treaties ratified by the United 
States are barely visible in the United States, whether to official authorities or to 
the individuals whom the Covenant is designed to protect.110 
California offers two examples of legislators attempting to incorporate a 
human rights norm statewide. The first concerns affirmative action. In 1996, 
California voters approved Proposition 209, amending the state constitution so as 
to prohibit discrimination or preferential treatment based on “race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public 
education, or public contracting.”111 In purpose and effect, Prop. 209 ended state 
and local affirmative action programs, such as university admissions programs and 
municipal contracting programs benefiting minority-owned businesses. It did not, 
however, define “racial discrimination.” 
State Assemblyman Mervyn Dymally, an opponent of Prop. 209, proposed 
legislation to use human rights law in an effort to “encourage outreach programs 
that do not provide preferential treatment” to minorities.112 He found that the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
which the United States ratified in 1994,113 defined racial discrimination consistent 
with state law. But the CERD also provides a safe haven for “special measures” 
such as affirmative action, defining such programs as not amounting to 
discrimination under the treaty.114 Dymally maneuvered his proposal through the 
California legislature, and in 2003, California Governor Gray Davis signed 
Assembly Bill (A.B.) 703,115 which incorporated into state law the definition of 
 
108. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 75. 
109. Johanna Kalb, Dynamic Federalism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 
1025, 1062 (2010). 
110. The reasons for this are varied: for one thing, the federal government ratified the ICCPR 
but has made limited, if any, efforts to encourage state incorporation of its provisions. The federal 
entities that engage with the Covenant—principally bureaus within the U.S. Department of State—
focus on promotion of human rights internationally, while the promotion of U.S. treaty obligations 
domestically tends to be associated only with reporting to human rights monitoring bodies such as the 
ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee. See Human Rights, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/j/ 
drl/hr/index.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). 
111. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31. 
112. See Jim Sanders, Outreach Legislation Rekindles Race Issue, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 22, 2003, 
at A1. 
113. CERD, supra note 18, pt. I, art. 1. 
114. Id. 
115. A.B. 703, 2003 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). 
UCILR V3I1 Assembled v9 (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2013  10:52 AM 
2013] STATE EXECUTION OF THE ICCPR 115 
 
“racial discrimination” as found in the CERD, including the provision approving 
of “special measures.” Litigants challenged Prop. 209, seeking to support an 
affirmative action program by using the definitions of the CERD adopted by A.B. 
703. They failed on the grounds of a state law principle: A.B. 703, as legislation, 
could not take precedence over Prop. 209, now a part of California’s 
constitution.116 As a result, state courts did not have an opportunity to interpret 
the CERD itself.  
Shortly after A.B. 703 was adopted, the California legislature passed A.B. 
358, which sought to “implement the principles underlying” CEDAW.117 The bill 
noted that CEDAW “provides a framework for governments to examine the 
existing rights of women and girls in areas that include employment opportunities, 
education, health care, and equal protection under the law.”118 Specifically it would 
have required three state agencies—the departments of corrections, education, 
and health services—to “conduct an evaluation of their own departments to 
ensure that the state does not discriminate against women . . . .”119 However, 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed the measure, arguing that the bill was 
“duplicative of existing policy and unnecessary.”120 
While A.B. 703 and A.B. 358 show that California legislators may be willing 
to engage with the provisions of international human rights law, neither had an 
appreciable, sustained impact on state policy or interaction with human rights 
norms. A.B. 703 had a narrow aim, and once it was found not to be an effective 
measure against Prop. 209, its policy purpose appears to have disappeared. A.B. 
358 failed because of the assumption that additional mechanisms were not 
required to implement human rights law in the United States. Governor 
Schwarzenegger’s argument that A.B. 358 would have duplicated state programs 
may have merit, but the bill would have innovated by requiring the state to 
consider a human rights treaty, CEDAW, in assessing issues of discrimination 
against women in California. The examples of A.B. 703 and A.B. 358 provide 
glimpses into what might have been: the integration of human rights treaty norms 
in two areas of state governance, along with the likelihood of public engagement 
that would have accompanied such reform. It is that kind of innovation that the 
ratification of the ICCPR invited and that few state or municipal entities have 
taken up.  
In summary, federal and state governments have not provided a basis for 
individuals to pursue human rights claims under the Covenant in judicial or 
 
116. See Coral Constr., Inc. v. City of S.F., 235 P.3d 947, 947, 953, 963 (Cal. 2010); C & C 
Const., Inc. v. Sacramento Mun. Utility Dist., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); see also 
Kalb, supra note 99, at 1068. 
117. A.B. 358, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Governor’s Veto Message, A.B. 358, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004), http://www 
.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab_358_vt_20040929.html. 
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administrative settings. Enabling such litigation at the federal level would have 
several salutary effects, especially by involving Americans more intimately in the 
interpretation of human rights norms to which the United States is bound. 
However, federal ICCPR litigation is a pipe dream today; Congress is simply 
unlikely to take the kind of legislative initiative necessary to make it possible. Nor 
is the executive branch likely to initiate efforts to demand such action from the 
states.121 The federal government has shifted the responsibility for treaty 
implementation to the states without providing any mechanism for the federal 
government to encourage state implementation.122 
I am not suggesting that, as a result of the weak position of human rights 
treaties in American courts, litigants in federal or state courts have no option to 
seek to align U.S. behavior with such treaties; Americans often deploy federal and 
state constitutional provisions for the same aims.123 However, even with domestic 
constitutional litigation, there remains the fact that the United States, through 
formal constitutional processes, agreed to adhere to the norms of human rights 
treaties. The pursuit of claims under these treaties is the only sure way to assess 
U.S. compliance with human rights law in specific situations.124 International 
monitoring and other soft approaches have value, but they rarely if ever provide 
specific claimants with the opportunity to challenge U.S. adherence to its 
obligations under the Covenant and other instruments.  
III. ICCPR EXECUTION AT THE STATE LEVEL 
Given the federal government’s absence from domestic implementation of 
the ICCPR, I propose an approach that is consistent with the federal structure of 
the United States and with the federalism understandings present at the time of 
U.S. ratification: states should implement the Covenant themselves, incorporate its 
core substantive provisions into state law, and allow individuals the right to 
 
121. See Medellín v. Texas 552 U.S. 491, 525–26 (2008); see also Spiro, supra note 5, at 572. 
122. One may contrast the reticence to engage the states on human rights matters with the 
efforts to encourage states to implement relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations. See Outreach by the State Department, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/ 
consular_2244.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). However, the Supreme Court has limited the ability 
of the executive branch to require states to implement treaty obligations of the United States in those 
areas traditionally held to be under the jurisdiction of the states. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505. 
123. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human 
Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 368 (1997) (“[D]omestic constitutionalism has been the 
primary vehicle for recognition and enforcement of human rights in this country.”); see Henkin, supra 
note 22, 195 (“To a great extent, the international human rights obligations of the United States 
confirm rights which U.S. inhabitants already enjoy under the U.S. Constitution and other U.S. law.”); 
Harold Hongju Koh, America’s Jekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalism, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 64, 114. 
124. Upon ratification of the treaty, the United States accepted the competence of the Human 
Rights Committee to assess American behavior under the Covenant, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 3 
(1992), but the Committee’s comments on state practice are nonbinding and receive little or no 
attention in the United States. 
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challenge state action under the Covenant. “State execution” would be a form of 
treaty implementation in recognition of the fact that the ICCPR is otherwise 
unavailable in American courts. Ideally, this would involve the adoption of 
legislation or amendment of state constitutions to provide individuals with the 
right in state courts to raise claims arising under the Covenant or to support state 
law claims with Covenant provisions.  
State execution could also take alternative forms, such as requiring state 
agencies to take the Covenant into account in policymaking, allowing individuals 
to challenge state action through administrative channels, or requiring reporting by 
state agencies on their implementation of the Covenant. These alternatives, 
however, would generally be weak compared to giving individuals themselves the 
tools to challenge state behavior, since agencies lack the incentives of individuals 
to ensure compliance.  
States may pick up where Congress and the executive branch left off.125 State 
legislators should take up the role of treaty implementation, even without the 
pressure of the federal government, and they can do so while being sensitive to 
federalism concerns and advancing U.S. objectives in the area of human rights, 
both at home and abroad.  
A. Why State Execution? 
State execution would serve a number of purposes. First, state execution 
would provide a compliance mechanism at a time when there is no administrative, 
adjudicative, or political process in the United States to assess U.S. behavior under 
the Covenant. The only formal assessment of U.S. compliance occurs as part of 
the Human Rights Committee’s monitoring of U.S. behavior (done for all states 
that have accepted the Committee’s competence), which occurs typically every five 
years and, even then, only in the context of general assessments rather than 
individual allegations.126 Moreover, the Human Rights Committee has focused 
more on areas under federal than state jurisdiction.127 State court adjudication 
under the ICCPR would implement American obligations in the context of 
American experience and legal culture. Unlike jurisdictions subject to the 
European or Inter-American courts of human rights, there would be no 
supranational court overseeing U.S. implementation.  
 
125. Or, as Johanna Kalb put it in the context of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, states should “fill the void created by lack of federal action.” Kalb, supra note 109, at 1049. 
126. For Human Rights Committee practice with respect to state reporting, see Office of the 
United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee 
(Rev.1) 15 (2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf. 
127. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: 
United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006). 
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Second, state execution would provide individual citizens, judges, legislators, 
and others with a mechanism to engage with the norms of human rights law. 
Americans have very little connection or experience with international law 
generally and human rights law specifically, even though many of its core 
principles are a part of U.S. law and bind the United States under the Supremacy 
Clause. As Catherine Powell put it, “most Americans see international human 
rights law as an irrelevant offshore body of law.”128 Yet this perception of 
irrelevance misses the reality of an increasing dynamism of human rights discourse 
and litigation in Europe and the Americas that is informing American 
constitutional adjudication, as seen in Roper v. Simmons,129 Lawrence v. Texas,130 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,131 and other decisions by the Supreme Court. Until litigants 
are provided with the tools themselves to deploy human rights treaty arguments, 
the ICCPR will continue to be seen as a distant, largely inapplicable body of law.132 
With state execution of the ICCPR, the ability of the United States to 
influence the development of human rights law may change as well. That influence 
has decreased in the years since President Carter first submitted the ICCPR to the 
Senate in 1978. The United States has mechanisms to influence individual state 
behavior, through its domestic sanctions against serious human rights violators, 
visa denial programs, economic and military aid conditionality requirements, 
actions on the United Nations Security Council, and so forth.133 Yet its capacity to 
influence law and doctrine is weak because of its failure to engage human rights 
law qua human rights law. 
The doctrinal development of human rights law has advanced significantly 
since U.S. ratification, mainly in the context of the European and Inter-American 
human rights systems. The European Court of Human Rights, implementing 
norms of the European Convention on Human Rights that closely mirror those in 
the ICCPR, has adjudicated thousands of cases that touch on all areas of civil and 
political rights. The United States has limited impact over human rights 
jurisprudence in Europe in part because our courts do not engage the language of 
the ICCPR and other human rights treaties. As a result, human rights norms that 
may influence American law—as seen, for instance, in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in Lawrence, Graham, Roper, and other recent cases—develop without 
 
128. Powell, supra note 5, at 260 (citation omitted). 
129. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005). 
130. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). 
131. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006). 
132. Frank Michelman imagined what it would be like “[i]f Americans could see their judges 
grappling, openly and apparently honestly, with emergent world legal opinion—world legal opinion, 
not world moral opinion—regarding the human-rights matters that divide us.” Frank Michelman, 
Integrity-Anxiety, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 64, 241, 275. He 
concluded that they might regain “confidence in the objectivity . . . of the resulting adjudications.” Id. 
133. See generally U.S. INST. OF PEACE, IMPLEMENTING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY (Debra 
Liang-Fenton ed., 2004). 
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the input of American legal institutions. State execution provides a direct 
opportunity for American judges to evaluate the provisions of the ICCPR in the 
context of the United States. To be sure, such consideration would require state 
actors to ensure that their behavior conforms to the requirements of the 
Covenant, but it would also allow judges considerable authority to influence the 
development of human rights norms abroad.  
Third, incorporation of the ICCPR could directly support litigation over 
critical problems within the states today. In areas such as prison conditions, 
nondiscrimination, family law and marriage equality, children’s rights, political 
participation, and religious freedom, to name a few, the states have obligations 
under the ICCPR that are not being tested today.134 It may very well be that state 
and federal constitutional protections adequately support rights such as these, but 
in the absence of litigation over the human rights obligations themselves, we can 
only guess.  
Finally, state incorporation would serve the “dialogic” purposes identified by 
Catherine Powell.135 State incorporation efforts would be seeking not to displace 
the federal government but rather to implement at the state level the obligations 
taken on by the United States when it ratified the ICCPR. Once states begin to 
play concrete roles as interpreters of the ICCPR at the state level, state actors 
could inform federal lawmaking in the area of human rights. In turn, the foreign 
policy arguments articulated by Presidents Carter and Bush—namely, that 
ratification would enable the United States to press for greater human rights 
implementation worldwide—would be strengthened to the extent that U.S. 
officials can point to implementation at the state level in the United States. 
B. Elements of State Execution 
Each state has its own legislative traditions and requirements, and some may 
find it appropriate to incorporate the ICCPR through regular legislation while 
others may need to do so through state constitutional change.136 Some may even 
decide that softer approaches would be appropriate, such as “sense of the 
legislature” resolutions that indicate support for the judicial use of the ICCPR in 
state law cases. Rather than assessing the variety of options that might be 
available, I want to sketch out some of the main elements and questions that 
should be considered in any such effort.  
 
134. For a critical examination of U.S. behavior under the ICCPR, see Dimming the  
Beacon of Freedom: U.S. Violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ACLU  
(June 20, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/human-rights-womens-rights/dimming-beacon-freedom-us-
violations-international-covenant-civil-politic. 
135. Powell, supra note 5, at 249–50. 
136. This was, for instance, the hurdle faced by A.B. 703 in California, mere legislation that 
was trumped by the constitutional change effected by Prop 209. See supra text accompanying notes 
108 and 112. 
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Cause of action or principle of interpretation? States would enjoy a variety of 
alternatives for the incorporation of the Covenant under state law. Under one 
conception, states could provide an express cause of action for alleged violations 
of the ICCPR. Under another, state law could authorize courts merely to take into 
account the relevant provisions of the ICCPR when adjudicating state law claims. 
In either case, the result would be to bring international human rights law directly 
into litigation over state action.  
If a state were to authorize causes of action arising under the ICCPR, one 
could imagine an attempt to remove the case to federal court under federal 
question jurisdiction. The Supreme Court enunciated the standard for federal 
question removal in 2005 in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & 
Manufacturing, stating that “the question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a 
stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may 
entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and 
state judicial responsibilities.”137 U.S. ratification may support non-removal, as the 
Senate and executive branch made clear that the ICCPR would not be 
implemented in federal courts absent legislation. Moreover, the federalism 
understanding suggests that states would indeed implement the Covenant as they 
deem appropriate. In this context, arguments for federal question removal may 
have much less force. Even if removal were successful, the federal court may very 
well apply the state law incorporating the ICCPR, thus supporting rather than 
undermining the effort to implement the Covenant.138 
Wholesale or provision-by-provision incorporation? The ICCPR contains substantive 
and structural provisions. Any incorporation should not address the provisions of 
the Covenant that pertain to the Human Rights Committee or other structural 
issues under the treaty, as these pertain to the obligations of the federal 
government. Instead, states should integrate the substantive provisions of the 
ICCPR that pertain to individual rights, those found in Part III of the Covenant, 
Articles 6 through 27, and the nondiscrimination provisions of Articles 2 and 3. 
One might also exclude provisions that fall outside the jurisdiction of the states. 
For instance, Article 13 of the Covenant pertains to aliens “lawfully in the territory 
of a state Party,” clearly implicating an area of law preempted by federal law and 
policy.139 Alternatively, states could incorporate the Covenant in full with the 
exception of provisions governed by federal law.  
At the same time, to the extent that the Covenant’s provisions might offer 
less protection to individual rights than state or federal constitutions, state 
 
137. Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). 
138. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 795 (5th ed. 2011) (discussing application of “federal common law choice-
of-law rules” in other contexts where federal question jurisdiction exists (but where no express federal 
substantive statutory rules apply)). 
139. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 13. 
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execution should recognize the provision that is more protective of individual 
rights. This is clearly the case with respect to freedom of expression, as seen in the 
reservation of the United States to Article 20 of the ICCPR.140 State execution 
might indicate such a principle explicitly in law. 
Finally, Article 4 provides that states parties may derogate from ICCPR 
obligations “[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation 
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed.”141 Article 4 is clearly aimed at 
central governments, given the focus on “the life of the nation,” and state 
legislation should not interfere with national policy in this respect. 
The treatment of the RUDs in state execution. The RUDs attached to the U.S. 
ratification pose a question for state incorporation efforts: Should they be given 
effect? Since states may adopt a law that provides greater protections for 
individuals than those offered under federal law, it would seem to be available to 
states to adopt the ICCPR without the RUDs, except to the extent that the RUD 
provides greater protection than under the ICCPR. This is clearly the case with 
respect to Article 20’s restrictions on war propaganda and incitement to 
discrimination, neither of which may be prohibited under U.S. constitutional 
law.142  
Other RUDs merely preserve U.S. federal and state interpretations that likely 
fall below the standards of the ICCPR. For instance, the United States reserved 
the right to impose capital punishment on juveniles and the right to treat juveniles 
as adults in the criminal justice system. States have recognized authority to 
maintain or eliminate the death penalty within their jurisdictions, including 
eliminating it for particular classes of defendants (so long as they are non-
discriminatory).143 A state’s decision to comply with the ICCPR—which does not 
itself abolish capital punishment—would neither be inconsistent with the U.S. 
reservation nor with the state-federal distribution of authority in this area. One 
could make the same argument with respect to the U.S. reservation of the right to 
apply the term “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” only to the extent that it 
is bound by the prohibition on “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment” 
under the U.S. Constitution. States may clearly go beyond the floor set by the 
Constitution in these areas. 
C. Potential Arguments Against State Execution 
One can imagine a number of potential arguments against such state-level 
integration. Those arguments might include the following: 
 
140. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102–23, at 10–11 (1992). 
141. Id. art. 4, ¶ 1. 
142. Id. art. 20. 
143. In any event, the Supreme Court found the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional in 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). 
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A state court cause of action would require authorization from Congress. Some may 
argue that, since the ICCPR ratification asserted the treaty as non-self-executing, 
“Congress would have to pass general implementing legislation in order to make 
the treaty enforceable in domestic courts.”144 This is clearly true with respect to 
claims in federal court, given the explicit and repeated nature of U.S. statements at 
the time of ratification. However, it is not clear why this should be a bar to state 
enforcement. U.S. resistance to the Covenant rested largely on the perception that 
it would obligate the states to take action; the Senate and the executive branch, 
under Presidents Carter and Bush, did not want the treaty to have that effect. By 
contrast, however, the federalism understanding suggests that states could 
implement the treaty “to the extent that State and local governments exercise 
jurisdiction” over matters under the Covenant. Neither the Senate nor the 
executive branch suggests that the states would be precluded from implementing 
the treaty in a way they would deem appropriate. 
State court interpretations of treaty law are preempted by federal law. Rather than 
asserting that states are preempted from implementing the ICCPR, U.S. 
ratification of the Covenant provided for a predominant state role in the field. It 
would thus be difficult to sustain an argument that a state choosing incorporation 
of the Covenant as the means for implementation would be barred under 
principles of preemption. Nonetheless, it is worth examining the two principles 
that the Supreme Court looks to in considering preemption claims. 
In the case of “field preemption,” “the States are precluded from regulating 
conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined 
must be regulated by its exclusive governance.”145 With regard to the substantive 
provisions of the ICCPR, the federal government has already made clear that 
those principles may be implemented by the states to the extent that the 
provisions fall under state jurisdiction. Field preemption should not be a concern.  
In the case of “conflict preemption,” “state laws are preempted when they 
conflict with federal law.”146 Allowing state-level causes of action under the 
ICCPR could be seen as an implementation of federal law (i.e., a ratified treaty) 
and should not be seen in any way as conflicting with law at the federal level. One 
might take the preemption argument a step further and suggest that, as in the state 
sanctions struck down in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,147 so too state 
incorporation of the ICCPR would interfere with the federal government’s 
conduct of foreign affairs. Such an argument seems far-fetched. In Crosby, the 
State of Massachusetts adopted sanctions against entities doing business with 
Burma.148 Yet shortly after the state law was adopted, Congress imposed its own 
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sanctions against Burma, some of which were mandatory while others were left to 
the discretion of the President.149 The Court found that the federal legislative 
framework preempted the state law, which it held could have interfered with the 
discretion given to the President by law.150 Nor would Congress have “intended 
the President’s effective voice to be obscured by state or local action” in the 
context of sanctions against Burma.151 
The principles underlying Crosby do not apply in the context of state 
execution of the ICCPR. There is no federal law with which state execution would 
conflict. It is likely that the president’s “voice” in foreign relations, at least with 
respect to efforts to improve human rights worldwide, would be enhanced rather 
than diminished. There is nothing particularly new or radical about state 
engagement with international legal norms. Julian Ku has shown that states have 
long played a role in interpreting and integrating international law at the state 
level.152 The very fact of longtime state engagement with international legal norms 
undermines a possible, related argument that state court judges have too little 
familiarity with human rights law or international law to adjudicate such claims 
effectively.153  
The ratification of the ICCPR rested on the presumption that the Covenant 
would not provide litigants with a cause of action, but this statement should be 
seen in the context of non-self-execution. The Covenant does not provide a cause 
of action for two reasons: one, according to the Senate and the executive branch, 
the ICCPR requires legislation to bring it into effect; and two, the Senate and the 
executive branch did not want to “federalize” state law. Given the expectation of 
state-level implementation, incorporation by a state should serve to execute the 
Covenant for state purposes, allowing states to domesticate the ICCPR 
themselves. 
Rosalyn Higgins, a former president of the International Court of Justice and 
eminent British international law professor, noted the concern about 
incorporating a cause of action from human rights treaties into domestic law. She 
answered it by comparing human rights treaties to other kinds of international 
agreements. She wrote,  
 
149. Id. at 368–71. 
150. Id. at 376–77. 
151. Id. at 381. 
152. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, Customary International Law in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 265 
(2001); Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380 (2006); Julian G. Ku, The State of 
New York Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457 
(2004). 
153. The American Society of International Law, the leading organization of practitioner and 
academic international lawyers in the United States, has an active program of judicial training in 
international law, undermining arguments about the lack of awareness of such norms at the state 
level. See Judicial Education & Training, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., http://www.asil.org/judicial-education-
training.cfm (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). 
UCILR V3I1 Assembled v9 (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2013  10:52 AM 
124 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:95 
 
[H]uman rights treaties are not characterised by inter-state reciprocity. 
States parties agree unconditionally to guarantee rights to individuals. 
Certain presumptions would seem to operate. Legal rights should be 
justiciable. The beneficiary of a right should be able to ensure its 
efficacity in law. And the easiest way for an individual to enforce his 
rights is before his own courts, and not before an international 
tribunal.154 
The provisions of the ICCPR are too vague to be applied in state or federal court. The 
Covenant includes general language intended to constrain the behavior of official 
authorities. It does not attempt, in the fashion of a civil or criminal code, to 
specify the requirements of official behavior in all possible circumstances. The 
Covenant balances the need for general principles with the need for specific 
enough guidance in particular cases. Thus,  
the provisions are sufficiently definite to have real significance both as a 
statement of law and as a guide to practice, but they are also sufficiently 
general and flexible to apply to all individuals and to allow for 
adjustments of national laws to suit peoples at different stages of social 
and political development.155 
Judges would do as they have always done: interpret the provisions in the 
context of the claims arising under them, deploying the appropriate tools of 
construction. In the context of treaty interpretation, this would mean interpreting 
a provision “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”156 Judges would look to state practice, negotiating history, and other 
courts’ interpretations, among other things, in order to clarify the meaning of 
particular provisions.157 It is possible, and perhaps likely, that state judges will 
more often than not rely on state law even where provisions of the Covenant 
apply.158 But giving litigants the tools of the Covenant provides a way to integrate 
U.S. obligations into state court decisions and provide an avenue for a human 
rights dialogue between U.S. and non-American judges. 
That said, some provisions of the Covenant might be more difficult to 
interpret than others. For instance, Article 23 includes provisions related to family 
law, some of which will be clearer than others. Article 23(1), for example, merely 
states that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
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entitled to protection by society and the State.”159 This may present more 
difficulties than Article 23(3), which requires “the free and full consent” of 
partners intending to marry, while Article 23(4) requires authorities “to ensure 
equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage 
and at its dissolution.”160 The enforcement of such norms should present little 
difficulty to judges familiar with the tools of interpretation. 
CONCLUSION 
Particularly in an environment in which international and foreign law are 
broadly attacked in a number of state legislative and litigation contexts,161 it may 
seem quixotic to propose a manner of thinking about human rights treaty 
implementation that focuses on the state. Yet state execution follows logically 
from the structure of the ICCPR, which expressly applies to sub-federal units of 
parties to the Covenant, and perhaps more importantly from the ratification deal 
struck in 1991. 
Even beyond the acceptability of state execution, broadly applicable 
initiatives at the state level would serve a crucial public purpose: highlighting that 
human rights norms, part of U.S. law through the treaty-making process of the 
Constitution, belong neither to the Right nor to the Left. They are neither liberal 
nor conservative. The norms of the ICCPR serve this purpose especially, 
reflecting an effort to guarantee the liberty of the individual worldwide and 
ensuring individual protections against the encroachment of governmental 
authorities at all levels. It may very well be that the need for the ICCPR is much 
less evident in the United States than in other countries where the struggle for 
human rights may be intense and a matter of life-and-death. But until states fill the 
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